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RESEARCH ARTICLE
‘The Rhino Horn on Display Has Been Replaced by a 
Replica’: Museum Security in Finland and England
Louise Grove* and Suzie Thomas†
Museums are an integral part of the cultural life of societies. As well as having intangible value, many 
collections may also have considerable financial value and present a temptation to thieves. Furthermore, 
threats exist from accidents, natural disasters, and vandalism, among many other risks that have to be 
taken into account when building up museums security measures. In recent years, high-profile art thefts 
from museums and even, regrettably, acts of terror have drawn attention to the vulnerability of museum 
institutions as sites of crime and catastrophe. In particular, balancing visitor enjoyment and accessibility 
of the exhibits with security can be difficult for many. Despite awareness of these concerns, museums 
security remains to date under-represented in museological discourses, perhaps in part because of its 
perceived pragmatic nature. Another reason may be the difficulty of discussing in a meaningful way infor-
mation that is often confidential and sensitive. In this paper, based on research carried out in Finland 
and England, we aim to analyse some of the key issues for museums security, which, whilst observed in 
northern European settings, also have relevance for museums globally. We set this discussion against the 
backdrop of ethical considerations and present our methodology for gathering the data and for discussing 
our results in a way which is both sensitive to confidentiality issues and still of use to the wider security, 
museums, and cultural heritage sectors.
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Background
In this paper we make an initial foray into the security 
challenges facing museums in two European countries: 
England and Finland. Both have wealthy economies and 
are members of the European Union (EU). Both countries 
also have active and vibrant museum communities. 
Museums provide an important service for the cultural 
memory of societies and individuals, taking in both tangi-
ble and intangible cultural heritage (Yoshida 2004: 109–
110). Estimates vary over the total number of museums in 
both England and Finland, affected by the constant flux 
caused by openings and closures of museums, as well as 
by continued debates as to what constitutes a museum 
in the first place (see, for example, Davies et al 2010), and 
therefore as to what is counted in official statistics. The 
Museums Association suggests that the UK as a whole 
(including England) has around 2,500 museums in total 
(MA n.d.), and 1,315 museums in England were registered 
under Arts Council England’s Accreditation Scheme as of 
June 2015 (ACE 2015). Meanwhile, Finland, with a signifi-
cantly smaller population (just under 5.5 million, com-
pared to almost 64 million for the whole of the UK as of 
2013; Eurostat 2014), may have over 1,000 museums, of 
which only about a third are run as professional organiza-
tions (Museot.fi n.d.). Table 1 shows the number and type 
of professionally run museums in Finland and the UK in 
2013 and 2012 respectively, as estimated by the European 
Group on Museum Statistics (EGMUS).
The International Council of Museums offers a defini-
tion of a museum as being ‘a non-profit, permanent insti-
tution in the service of society and its development, open 
to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, com-
municates and exhibits the tangible and intangible herit-
age of humanity and its environment for the purposes of 
education, study and enjoyment’ (ICOM 2015). This defini-
tion, which has been through several revisions since the 
original version adopted in 1946 with the formation of 
ICOM itself, tacitly indicates the importance of collections 
and of the need to make these available for the three goals 
of ‘education, study and enjoyment’. These latter goals 
have been especially emphasised in recent decades, with 
Falk and Dierking (2013: 14) noting: 
Grove and Thomas: ‘The Rhino Horn on Display Has Been Replaced by a Replica’Art. 1, page 2 of 11  
Whereas as recently as a generation ago most 
museums would have listed ‘education’ as a distant 
third on their list of institutional priorities, behind 
collections and research, these same museums 
would now be inclined to state that they are, first 
and foremost, centers for public learning – or at 
the very least, equally concerned about education, 
research and collections. 
This emphasis on public learning does not detract from 
the museum’s role as a repository for art and cultural her-
itage, and indeed roles and expertise related to conserva-
tion and archiving are integral to museum staffing. How-
ever, it does highlight the challenges for museums – not 
only to preserve and protect cultural material, but also to 
make it accessible and available to a variety of different 
audiences and their needs. From the point of view of secu-
rity, this creates challenges in ensuring the safety of both 
the museum collections and museum visitors without 
compromising the visitor experience. Furthermore, the 
special, ‘musealized’ status of objects in museums – their 
selection due to a connection to a significant individual 
or as representative of communities, historical periods, 
artistic or craft styles, or scientific advancements (to name 
a few possibilities) – transforms them from mere objects 
into ‘museum pieces’. Some objects, such as examples of 
fine art or jewellery, have an intrinsic financial value in any 
case because of their status as a rare object, the skill associ-
ated with their production (including possible association 
with a ‘master’ in their field), or the material from which 
they are made. An object’s antiquity may also enhance 
its financial value. Many more objects, for example those 
connected to the social history of specific communities, 
are collected as examples of everyday life or particular tra-
ditional practices. Museums cannot preserve everything: 
‘much has to be left to oblivion and destruction. Therefore 
both our understanding of the past and the cultural and 
natural heritage we have created are results of cultural 
choices’ (Vilkuna 2011: 24). The musealization process 
goes beyond the act of simply collecting: ‘Objects that 
serve as carriers of information, after being musealized, 
become the core of museum activities’ (Wan-Chen 2012: 
20). This transformation through musealization, therefore, 
can enhance the cultural and scientific ‘value’ of a museum 
object to a greater extent than if it had not been acquired 
for a museum collection. Hence, if museum objects are 
lost or destroyed – be it deliberately or accidentally – the 
loss is far greater than merely that of their financial worth.
In 2015, both England (as part of the UK) and Finland 
had general elections. The new governments will 
doubtless make further changes to funding for muse-
ums. In England, the right-leaning Conservative Party 
won an overall majority. In Finland, a right-leaning coa-
lition government was formed from three parties: the 
Centre Party, the Finns Party, and the National Coalition 
Party. Shortly after the UK’s general election, a budget cut 
of £30 million was announced for the Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport responsible for funding, along 
with other contributors, the UK’s 16 free-to-enter national 
museums (DCMS 2015; HMT and Osborne 2015; Sullivan 
2015). In Finland the Ministry of Education and Culture is 
responsible for museums, providing around 40 per cent 
of their funding, with the remainder coming from local 
authorities, museum activities, and sponsors (Ministry of 
Education and Culture n.d.). Participants in the research 
that we discuss in this paper – namely interviewees from a 
small sample of museums in England and Finland – were 
understandably concerned about the future. In Finland, 
for example, the economy has been contracting for over 
three years (Rosendahl 2015). Budgetary decisions follow-
ing the election were not announced at the time of writ-
ing, although the Finnish government aims to cut around 
€6 billion from its budget (Troy-Donovan 2015). The 
museum sector as a whole has traditionally complained of 
under-resourcing curtailing their operational and creative 
ambitions (e.g. Hatton 1989). Under even more straitened 
operating conditions in both countries, museums must 
make difficult decisions about their priorities. Preferred 
security upgrades may not be possible, and compromises 
are sought.
Opportunity plays a role in causing crime (Felson and 
Clarke 1998; Clarke 2012), and this is as true for museums 
as for any other setting. A survey of museums around the 
world suggested that one in four museums did not have 
up-to-date records of items in storage, one in three did 
not have clear management procedures in place, and one 
in ten had experienced object theft (ICCROM-UNESCO 
2011). In practice, this suggests that the true extent of loss 
or theft from museums is unknown – if storage records 
are in chaos, it is impossible to keep track of missing items 
accurately. Interestingly, there is some evidence to suggest 
that museum collections are at greatest risk of theft from 
those who have the greatest access: in one example, the 
Australian Museum fell victim to an employee who stole 
over 2,000 artefacts between 1997 and 2002 (ICAC 2003). 
However, the extent to which thefts occur internally is less 
certain, although Mandel (2008) reports the FBI belief that 
‘about 90 percent of art thefts from museums are internal’ 
and Peek (2011: 2) estimates that ‘the probability of inter-
nal theft, by own staff, might be ten times as high as that 
Country State-owned Locally or 
regionally owned
Other publicly 
owned
Privately 
owned
Total 
museums
Finland (2013 figures) 19 208 9 86 322
UK1 (2012 figures) 58 581 83 910 1732
Table 1: Museums in Finland and the United Kingdom (EGMUS 2015).
1 Whilst the figures in this table include museums from Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the present study exam-
ined English museums only.
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of external theft’. This would certainly be consistent with 
opportunity theories, but we must also remember that, 
by their very nature, museums provide public access to 
their valuable contents, thus potentially widening the net 
of individuals and groups with opportunity to offend. It 
is not usually practical nor desirable to suggest that we 
remove at-risk objects altogether. However, there may 
be other ways to protect our cultural heritage. We must 
also be aware that security issues within a museum are far 
more diverse than simply that of theft, with other security 
issues such as the safety of staff and visitors also coming 
into play. In the remainder of the paper we describe our 
methodological approach, discuss ethical constraints on 
both our research and the dissemination of our results, 
present our initial findings on the breadth of security 
problems faced by museums, and discuss the current 
methods of tackling security issues. Finally, we identify a 
need for further solutions. 
Methodology
The goal of this research project was to provide an explor-
atory study of the different security-related issues perti-
nent to museums of different sorts within two northern 
European countries: England and Finland. We inter-
viewed 13 members of staff, from four museums in each 
country (eight museums in total), and digitally recorded 
the conversations. Rather than working through a rigid 
list of questions, we used a semi-structured approach 
(Cohen and Crabtree 2006), guided by themes such as 
organizational structure, known incidents, and external 
networks and contacts. This way, the interviewee retained 
some control over the issues they felt were pertinent to 
discuss, including – significantly – how they chose to 
interpret and define ‘security’ itself. Reflecting on our 
own roles in this process, as a criminologist and a muse-
ologist carrying out all interviews jointly, we noticed an 
interesting outcome from working together in this way. 
Not only did carrying out the interviews together mean 
that we were both privy to the content of each interview 
first-hand, but we noticed that our different interests 
and disciplinary backgrounds led us to notice and ask 
about different aspects during each of the interviews. We 
believe this was an extremely beneficial feature of the 
approach that we adopted.
We selected our case-study museums in a way that 
would enable us to glean data from a broad spectrum of 
museum types. We considered the following criteria in 
order to inform our selections:
• Governance. The selected museums represented a 
range of different models for governance, ranging 
from national-status museums through to those run 
by local authorities, universities, or private founda-
tions and charitable trusts and to volunteer-led 
organizations. 
• Collection. Although we do not discuss the nature 
of the different collections of participant museums 
in this paper for security reasons, we took care to in-
clude museums with a wide range of different types 
(and sizes) of collections. 
• Location. Although limited to the national bounda-
ries of Finland and England, the selected museums 
were found in a range of different urban or rural set-
tings, ranging from city centre locations to suburban 
venues and locations set in the countryside. 
The staff we interviewed had been employed by their 
organizations for an average of 10 years. When contact-
ing our selected museums, we explained that we wanted 
to interview staff representing a diverse range of roles at 
the museum. In practice, the roles in which the staff will-
ing to be interviewed were employed were typically to do 
with security, operations, curating, conservation, and/or 
overall management. Only one of the interviewees at our 
selected museums was in a role devoted entirely to secu-
rity, although several noted that security was a key com-
ponent of their day-to-day responsibilities. Due to the 
confidentiality requirements of this research (see ‘Ethics’ 
below) and the ease with which some of our participants 
may be identifiable, we do not detail in this paper the 
individual collections, sizes, or staffing of the museums. 
All participant interviews were digitally recorded, and 
both the recordings and their transcriptions have been 
stored securely in an encrypted form. This issue was par-
ticularly salient because the research team is based in two 
separate countries and needed to communicate remotely. 
We used the open source software 7-Zip to encrypt all 
files with potentially identifiable information (for exam-
ple, audio files). Files were transferred using end-to-end 
encryption in a secure shared storage space. Password pro-
tection was used on all computers. Furthermore, the pro-
ject employed the services of a transcriber who signed a 
confidentiality agreement and undertook to destroy their 
own copies of the recordings and transcriptions once their 
work was completed.
Ethics
There were ethical challenges to both gathering and 
interpreting the data for this study. ICOM has a Code of 
Ethics (ICOM 2013) to which all member museums and 
museum professionals are expected to adhere. The code 
covers a wide range of activities, from ethical acquisition 
and deaccession of collections through to how to protect 
cultural objects in the event of a natural disaster or con-
flict. In Section 8.7, the code is very clear on the discussion 
of museum security: ‘Information about the security of 
the museum or of private collections and locations visited 
during official duties must be held in strict confidence by 
museum personnel’ (ICOM 2013: 12). Therefore, by the 
very nature of what we were doing we knew we could 
face some opposition from our potential informants. In 
practice, we found that everyone that we approached was 
very keen to discuss security with us – perhaps a reflection 
of the social capital bestowed upon us as academics from 
well-known universities. Nonetheless, we were careful 
to put appropriate measures in place. Informed consent 
forms were distributed, and further guidance on the ways 
in which the data were used was offered verbally where 
requested. Whilst we did not use set questions as part of 
our interview strategy, we did have themes that we hoped 
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to cover in the interviews, and these were shared with 
museum staff over email if requested. As part of the con-
sent process, we gave informants the right to withdraw all 
or part of their interview data at any time with no explana-
tion necessary. 
Furthermore, we recognized the possibility of identifica-
tion as a security risk: ‘A particular configuration of attrib-
utes can, like a fingerprint, frequently identify its owner 
beyond reasonable doubt’ (SRA 2003: 39). Due to the 
nature of the information disclosed to us, and because of 
the unique nature of each collection and museum setting, 
we have had to be exceptionally careful about the content 
of the paper. The last thing we want is to identify security 
vulnerabilities, or indeed to identify either institutions 
or individual museum professionals. The anonymization 
process – in which we balance the usefulness of our find-
ings with our ethical obligation to protect the individu-
als and institutions that cooperated in our research – has 
proven to be an intriguing challenge in the construction 
of this paper. 
As a means of ensuring that the paper’s content was 
satisfactory to the sensitivities of contributing individuals, 
the participants were offered the opportunity to comment 
on the paper prior to submission. To reduce further the 
potential to identify participating organizations, through-
out this paper we do not distinguish between Finnish and 
English museums except where there is a country-specific 
issue worthy of discussion.
Findings
The structure of this section follows four themes that were 
commonly raised by participants: personal safety, visitor 
experience, object protection, and repeat victimization.
Personal safety
The issue of personal safety was raised at every museum 
we visited without exception. It was a priority that came 
far ahead of that of the safety of collections, even though 
the relative likelihood of there being any incidents affect-
ing staff and visitors was perceived to be low: 
‘I don’t think [it] is very realistic [to assume] that 
somebody will nick that wallet, but if somebody 
nicks it, it’s just 50 euros or whatever. . . So, if there 
is somebody holding a knife or something: please 
take the money and go away and the police will 
pick you from the [exit].’
 Participant 5
‘. . .the policy here is that if somebody comes here 
with a gun. . . pointing a gun at you. . . you just do 
what they say, that’s the security [laugh] training 
we have.’
 Participant 1
This emphasis on the issue of personal safety was not 
reflective of a low level of security training. Participant 1, 
for example, worked at an organization where the entire 
customer service team was made up of trained security 
guards. Rather, it reflects both the priority placed on per-
sonal safety by our interviewees and the legal limits of the 
response available to staff. 
Lone working was of particular concern in some partici-
pant organizations in both countries. Lone working arose 
through issues of resourcing and site layout. In Finland, 
‘in libraries, archives, museums and operation of histori-
cal sites and buildings, employment decreased from 2010 
to 2013 by nearly 17 per cent’ (Statistics Finland 2014). 
To protect the staff in lone working situations, protocols 
were established to ensure safety. These generally con-
sisted of walkie-talkie communications with phrases to 
request support in particular situations. By requesting, 
for example, a member of maintenance to attend their 
location, workers could ensure that someone was on their 
way if they felt uncomfortable, whilst also communicating 
to the potential offender that they were not alone. Some 
sites had direct connections to the police, ensuring a swift 
response if needed. However, staffing levels were men-
tioned by several participants as a constraint on security: 
‘I’d like to see more staff actually in the gal-
lery spaces. . . and even if it’s somebody helping 
[children] to colour in. If they’re made aware that 
they’re also there as security for that gallery and 
obviously fire marshalling them. That’s certainly 
something I’d like.’ 
 Participant 12
A noticeable difference between the two countries was that, 
regardless of role, males working in Finnish museums would 
often have basic security training because over 75 per cent 
of Finnish men over the age of 30 have completed military 
service (Puolustusvoimat 2015). In England, nationals do 
not routinely participate in military service, and therefore 
museum staff would not generally be perceived as having 
this security background, although one respondent sug-
gested that senior museum security personnel were increas-
ingly being recruited from a police background. In Finland, 
security guards must be qualified to ensure compliance with 
state indemnity cover (State Indemnity Board 2013). The rel-
evant training was widely perceived as in need of reform and 
of tailoring to the museum context. In England, it was invar-
iably senior staff who took the training and then passed on 
key information to junior staff and volunteers, ostensibly to 
accommodate seasonal, part-time, and voluntary workers. It 
would seem logical to assume that there would be a height-
ened risk of missing or misunderstanding relevant informa-
tion with this latter ‘trickle-down’ arrangement, but as yet 
we have no evidence to support this hypothesis.
Personal safety was not just a concern about staff being 
exposed to criminal activity, but it was also a concern 
about staff working in older buildings or on sites where 
equipment was not perceived to be effective. Participants 
2, 3, and 4 worked for the same institution, and were 
interviewed together:
Participant 3: So they got problems for the health 
of the workers.
Grove and Thomas: ‘The Rhino Horn on Display Has Been Replaced by a Replica’ Art. 1, page 5 of 11
Participant 2: The condition is very poor in some 
places. . . We have some problems with mould and 
maybe. . .
Participant 4: And wet problem also. . . as like it’s 
cool. . . it’s [a] problem. 
Participant 3: We actually have one building closed 
now because of these problems.
The building(s) in which a museum is sited may also pre-
sent limitations to the security implemented at museums. 
Negotiations with local planning authorities may be nec-
essary for alterations to be made to listed or otherwise 
historic buildings: 
‘. . .we couldn’t do all [the] things we wanted, 
because of the nature of the building. And, but we 
used a lot of time for the planning and the authori-
ties were also part of it and they said. . . some things 
we wanted to do and they said “No, you can’t do 
that”, and then we have to rethink and luckily we 
had time.’
 Participant 7
We have stated elsewhere (Grove and Thomas 2014) 
that there is a need for a holistic approach to heritage 
assets including historic buildings, archaeological sites, 
and cultural landscapes. This exploratory work is already 
uncovering the need for a similar approach within the 
museum environment. That is, criminologists may be 
inclined to consider museum security as predominantly 
concerned with the protection of collections and indi-
viduals from crime and related harms, but, as we can 
see, the issues affecting museums are far more complex. 
Competing priorities for funding and conflicting con-
cerns over collections add to the need to create context-
specific security strategies and training, which we exam-
ine shortly.
Visitor experience
The visitor experience was a priority to the participants in 
this study. There were clear trade-offs between the secu-
rity of objects and the ability of the visitors to benefit from 
exhibitions:
‘There is the highest risk because you got people 
directly handling [the] collection. Unlike in other 
museums, we don’t have the. . . like here’s the junk 
and the handling collection or here’s this specific 
handling collection.’
 Participant 13
‘. . .you drill holes through the barrel but the holes 
have to be all the way through to the end of the 
barrel and 5 cm apart, so we are talking about 10, 
15 holes per barrel, so it doesn’t look like a gun 
anymore. . .[this] represents to us the same as if 
somebody asks to drill through the Mona Lisa.’
 Participant 1, on decommissioning display weap-
ons for safety
Participant 6: ‘So we have [an exhibition space] that 
has two floors. . . It’s been a bit problematic, ’cause 
the only guide there is, can’t be on the upstairs 
[floor] and now be running in every room and. . .’
Participant 5: ‘Yeah, and now. . . If there is only one 
guide working there we will close the upstairs.’
In this last example, the museum was planning to digitize 
the part of the collection that was not always open. Whilst 
this was clearly perceived to have some disadvantages – a 
secondary visitor experience and the risk of theft of the 
tablets on which this would be displayed – there was also 
the advantage of increased accessibility to visitors with dis-
abilities. Museums are not always custom-built, and, par-
ticularly in listed or otherwise protected buildings, there 
can be difficulties installing ‘reasonable adjustments’ such 
as lifts and ramps as required in England by the Equality 
Act 2010. Historic England (2015) provides guidance on 
reconciling access requirements with conservation sensi-
tivities. Whilst permission for changes may not always be 
straightforward, Historic England (2015: 4) recognizes that 
‘the survival of most historic buildings depends upon their 
continued, viable use and this may, among other things, 
require alterations to improve access’. Whilst the Finnish 
constitution enshrines equality for people with disabilities 
(Ministry of Justice n.d.), ‘there are no direct accessibility 
laws in Finland’ (Heinonen and Teittinen 2012). Nonethe-
less, building regulations provide guidance on accessibil-
ity (Ministry of the Environment 2005), although there is 
little evidence about compliance (Heinonen and Teittinen 
2012). Accessibility offered some challenges to our partici-
pants regarding balancing security and access.
At other times, the mitigation of security risks was prior-
itized over the visitor experience. The title of the present 
paper, ‘The Rhino Horn on Display Has Been Replaced by 
a Replica’, comes from a sign in one of the participant 
museums. Europol (2015) states that ‘powdered rhino 
horn, like many other animal and plant based powders, 
is used in non-evidence based traditional Asian medicine’. 
Following an international spate of thefts targeting rhino 
horns, museums have been advised to place the originals 
in more secure storage off-site, or even to destroy them 
(Atkinson 2011). This is consistent with the crime preven-
tion rationale of ‘removing objects’ in order to reduce 
the potential reward to the offender (Cornish and Clarke 
2003) and should not be a decision made lightly. It is com-
mon for museums to only display a small proportion of 
their collections (cf. NMDC 2003); however, it became 
clear in our interviews that security staff may choose to 
overrule curating decisions over which objects are on dis-
play. For example, following a high-profile terrorist attack 
(which took place elsewhere in the world), the security 
staff in one participant museum immediately removed 
relevant objects that they considered to be controversial 
from display:
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‘The fact is this. If we need to secure objects, then 
they are not here. So, if we are so nervous about an 
object that the security has to take absolute impor-
tance, you don’t give it to the public. You lock it 
away.’
 Participant 9
There seemed to be an expectation in some participant 
museums of a certain standard of behaviour from visitors, 
and alerting procedures were put into place in instances 
where new systems were installed:
‘. . .we were afraid in the beginning before the 
exhibition that people would get really annoyed 
because of that metal detector gate. So we commu-
nicated it very strongly both in our printed mate-
rial, web page and everything.’
 Participant 7
It seemed to be taken as read that there would be com-
pliance with the social contract of museum behaviours, 
in line with Trondsen (1976)’s findings that most people 
understand the basic role expectations within a museum 
environment. However, given the constant drive for 
museums to attempt to attract non-traditional museum-
goers and new audiences to their facilities (see for exam-
ple Lang et al 2006), it may be beneficial to assume less 
familiarity with these expectations. According to a recent 
European Commission study, 52 per cent of UK resi-
dents and 40 per cent of Finnish residents had been to 
a museum or gallery at least once over a twelve-month 
period, compared with an EU average of 37 per cent (EC 
2013). This suggests that there is still a relatively large 
proportion of EU residents without recent experience 
of a museum setting. Agreeing on and displaying rules 
is a basic step towards removing excuses from potential 
offenders (Cornish and Clarke 2003). Caution must be 
exercised, however, as enforcing new rules can some-
times be problematic. One participant organization had 
implemented a ‘no photographs’ rule after a security 
breach, in order to prevent their security systems from 
being visible more widely. However, given the small size 
and ubiquity of electronic equipment capable of taking 
photographs, it proved to be difficult to police, and the 
rule was perceived as having a negative effect on visitor 
experience. As a result, the institution reversed the deci-
sion to restrict photography.
The perception of security amongst visitors was impor-
tant to the members of staff in this study. One participant 
ensured they interviewed security guards (pre-selected by 
an external company) to assess whether they would pre-
sent a customer-friendly attitude, whilst another removed 
their security guard completely: 
‘. . .he was actually becoming a barrier between 
what we tried to offer and our visitors. You know, 
all of a sudden you got somebody in your face, with 
security. . . You know, it’s almost off-putting.’ 
 Participant 11
Another participant stated that their front-of-house secu-
rity was less about the likelihood of identifying people 
putting the museum at risk, but more about increasing 
the feeling of safety amongst visitors. Cordner (2010) 
argues that reducing fear of crime is in itself a worthwhile 
outcome of security measures – fear of crime certainly can 
have a devastating impact on people’s lives (cf. Skogan 
2006; Fear of Crime Team 2005), and we argue that muse-
ums should feel like a safe space in order to encourage 
widespread use.
Object protection
Protecting objects was, unsurprisingly, another priority 
for participants. Risks were perceived to come both from 
accidental damage and from purposive targeting such as 
theft. One incident was described where a visitor was lean-
ing against a valuable artwork: 
‘At the end of the day it doesn’t make a difference, 
I mean, what you’re exhibiting; [but] it just hap-
pened to be quite – a very expensive piece.’ 
 Participant 8
Display decisions were often informed by the perception 
of risk from this sort of non-malicious damage. Damage 
to objects appeared more common than thefts amongst 
our sample, and security was targeted accordingly. One 
concern was the risk of (targeted) vandalism of exhibits. 
This was particularly relevant where collections contained 
controversial pieces:
‘. . .one threat is that somebody tries to ruin our col-
lections, because of what they represent. . .’ 
‘But it’s kind of the threat that is really hard to 
manage, because it is enough [that] there is one per-
son with the, for example, spray bottle in the pocket 
[who] goes in and starts to spray our [exhibits].’
 Participant 1
Political, religious, and sexual artwork may be particularly 
susceptible to vandalism (Cordess and Turcan 1993). In 
2007 a Swedish exhibition of Andres Serrano’s sexually 
explicit photos was attacked by four individuals with crow-
bars and axes during visiting hours (Vogel 2007). Vandalism 
in museums does not just pose a risk to objects but is likely 
to impact on the staff, volunteers, and visitors who may be 
present at the time of an attack. As many examples of delib-
erate destruction of cultural heritage show, the loss of cul-
turally and/or religiously important material and structures 
also have a profound effect on the wellbeing and morale of 
communities (cf. Walasek 2015 for a detailed account of the 
destruction of cultural heritage in Bosnia in the 1990s and 
the political and cultural impacts of this destruction).
The perception of theft varied widely, and there was a 
suggestion by some of our participants that theft was rare:
‘. . .no theft of, of any, maybe something here in 
the shop.’
 Participant 7
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The true level of theft is probably impossible to ascertain: 
‘The fact is that we don’t, most museums [in 
the country] have no idea what’s been stolen. . . 
because you don’t realize it for 20, 30 years. So the 
extent of it is almost impossible to judge.’
 Participant 9
Not least because cataloguing practices were diverse:
‘We are partly doing cataloguing on the side. Kind 
of the inventory. So, it’s not very thorough work.’
 Participant 3
Although at least one participant took even relatively 
minor theft very seriously:
‘And if we have one theft at the shop, we will throw 
everything at it. We will have high visibility uni-
formed patrols in the shop, we will call the police 
in, we will circulate the suspects.’
 Participant 9
The strategy of this latter participant for dealing with inci-
dents utilizes the ‘broken windows’ theory (Wilson and 
Kelling 1982). The principle of that theory is that by cre-
ating an environment where low-level incidents are seen 
to be tackled immediately, the signals that any criminal 
activity might be acceptable are removed. The danger 
here is, of course, that without care this approach in itself 
detracts from the visitor experience. It was clear that par-
ticipant institutions took different approaches to striking 
this balance.
It was also apparent that, amongst our participants, 
some incidents were more memorable than others. 
Sometimes this was due to the type of security lapse that 
led to, for example, a break-in, such as when a miscom-
munication with contractors led to an area of a museum 
being left unlocked:
‘. . .all we can think is they actually stumbled in on it 
and thought. . . “this is the grand jewels, I’ll phone 
somebody up to bring a car outside”. No CCTV in 
the area, the door was left open.’
 Participant 11
At other times this was due to the type of incident:
‘So the memorable thing is for me when a drone 
landed on our roof that seemed to be spying on 
security systems.’
 Participant 9
Security provisions were not static, but were continually 
reassessed in response to the changing environment. They 
varied by location within the museum, and were altered 
to accommodate current exhibitions. External demands, 
such as stipulations from loaned exhibitions and insurers, 
played a large role in security decisions. In some cases, 
the state sets minimum standards of security (cf. State 
Indemnity Board 2013). One participant organization had 
recently made significant improvements to their security 
in order to enable them to host a high-profile collection. 
Whilst this represented an expensive investment, it was 
believed that this put the museum in a strong position to 
host future exhibitions of a similar calibre. As the security 
was being installed, it became clear that future exhibits 
may require even greater levels of protection – and so 
the plans were adapted during the process. In this way, a 
large initial investment was perceived to be worthwhile in 
the longer term. Security and other improvements were 
often contracted out to independent companies at some 
expense, particularly where a temporary increase in secu-
rity was required:
‘I wish that I was actually shown this budget 
before they started, we could have decided what 
we wanted and what we didn’t. It wasn’t until the 
last minute that we found out that the alarm sys-
tem had been dropped out of the list. And we said, 
oh great, the only trouble is we got the automatic 
doors, they have to have a fire alarm system linked 
to them. Otherwise we can’t legally open.’
 Participant 10
Background checks on staff members were varied and 
again often contracted out – although, almost universally, 
individuals with lower clearance did not have unsuper-
vised access to collections, and their access was restricted 
to certain sections of the museum premises. This was per-
ceived as particularly important for short-term employees 
and volunteers. In most museums, only a very small num-
ber of staff had unsupervised access to the most valuable 
collections. This is vital for security – Vollgraaff (2014) 
gives several examples of ‘insider’ involvement in theft 
from museums, although at least one of our participants 
disagreed that this was a problem:
‘The FBI say 85 per cent, I would say 5 per cent.’
 Participant 9 
Nonetheless, restricting the number of people accessing 
secure areas has two key benefits. First, fewer people have 
the opportunity to carry out thefts. Second, in the event of 
a theft there is a smaller pool of suspects with access to 
the objects, and therefore an arguably greater chance of 
detecting the culprit.
Repeat victimization
It was notable that repeat victimization was mentioned by 
more than one respondent. In one case, a small break-in – 
perceived by the respondent to be a scoping visit – was 
followed by a significant theft: 
‘And [the] year before, I can’t remember the date, 
but we had burglars coming in  we believe that they 
were the same group and they were just checking 
how to get in and they just saw that this wasn’t the 
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way to do it and then they used the other part of 
the museum to broke. . . break in.’
 Participant 1
A second museum made significant efforts to clean up 
graffiti as it occurred – again demonstrating the broken 
windows theory mentioned above, noting:
‘. . .we have the zero tolerance for graffiti so when 
immediately somebody was – we’ll wash the graf-
fiti away, because as you know it will spread the 
problem very quickly.’
 Participant 5
This is consistent with findings from other research – 
prior victimization is one of the best predictors of future 
risk (Pease 1998; Bernasco et al 2015). Targeting preven-
tive measures based on repeat victimization has also been 
shown to be an effective way of reducing risk (Grove et al 
2012; Grove and Farrell 2012). Speed is of the essence with 
repeat victimization prevention – offenders learn from the 
initial offence and repeats often occur soon after it, with 
repeated burglaries, for example, occurring within 48 
hours (Polvi et al 1990; Bernasco et al 2015). In contrast, 
museums are not set up to move at speed, and security 
upgrades are not just costly but must be planned effec-
tively so as not to conflict with other museum require-
ments. This causes delays with the implementation of 
such measures – a timescale of one year to make security 
changes in museums is not unrealistic. Whilst we have 
sympathy for the budgetary and structural constraints 
facing museums, there may be scope for more effective 
practices relating to short-term protection against a tem-
porary increased risk. Early indicators here suggest that we 
need to understand more about the repeat victimization 
profile of museums to identify the highest risk period. We 
can speculate, for example, that the more sophisticated 
targeting and planning of museum thefts may result in 
a different signature of repeat victimization risk in muse-
ums than in other sectors. 
Several participants gave examples of information shar-
ing in the immediate aftermath of a victimization to help 
guard neighbouring or similar museums against the risk 
of near and virtual repeats: 
‘. . .we got stung by that but we are able then to 
pass information on to all other attractions to 
say. . . be vigilant because there is obviously a team 
going around at the moment.’
 Participant 11
However, communication about security with partners 
outside the organization was haphazard in places, with 
personal relationships often dictating collaborations 
whilst broader security networks were rarely utilized 
by many network members even when they did exist. 
This suggests that it is perhaps not the unwillingness of 
organizations to discuss the issues relating to security 
which limits partnerships, but rather the absence of tai-
lored, relevant support groups. Time is precious for these 
organizations, and therefore they are necessarily selective 
about their professional relationships.
The need for effective communication about security 
and risk within museums is also important. Security meas-
ures or risks may change between shifts, and consistency 
of approach is necessary to ensure continued security, 
particularly immediately after an incident. Staff working 
irregular hours featured at some of the participant organi-
zations, and participants divulged a variety of measures 
to deal with this issue, including regular briefings, inter-
nal email, and handwritten notes to hand over important 
information. The imperfections of such systems were 
acknowledged by participants, but pragmatic considera-
tions outweighed these concerns:
‘There is a book, notebook, it’s the black book over 
there and of course, we have email. And then the 
oral tradition [laughs]. But yes, there’s a gap, of 
course.’
 Participant 8
Conclusion
This paper has taken some early steps into the realm of 
museum security. Whilst we only studied a small sam-
ple of museums and their staff, we have seen that there 
appears to be common ground between participants 
from a range of different types and sizes of museums. 
Structural constraints such as the building(s) in which the 
museum is sited, financial limitations on staffing, and the 
need to find a balance between security and visitor expe-
rience were frequently mentioned. Training was repeat-
edly highlighted as an area in need of improvement: it 
was often perceived as being outdated and irrelevant, and 
particularly difficult for seasonal and part-time employ-
ees to attend. Museums of different sizes and budgets 
also clearly need context-specific advice. Communication, 
both within and outside individual museums, varied con-
siderably and relied on informal relationships – leaving 
information sharing at risk of failure with the movement 
of staff. 
Despite the fact that museums work within often very 
limited budgets, we saw a lot of excellent practice within 
museum security. However, it would be fair to say that 
this was inconsistently applied across the museums where 
we interviewed. As well as the inevitable call for further 
research, we therefore suggest three steps forward that 
may be worthy of investigation.
First, whilst staff have many demands on their time, 
an over-reliance on informal relationships leaves institu-
tions often reliant on a single point of contact. We do not 
expect the small, voluntary-run museums to send a repre-
sentative to every international museum security confer-
ence. What we call for, rather, is the development of a set 
of networks for information sharing designed to meet the 
needs of museums across a range of sizes and budgets. It 
is vital to avoid imposing this from the top-down and to 
engage with museums at different levels to discover what 
would be useful in individual contexts, connecting muse-
ums with similar concerns to share best practice from a 
pragmatic standpoint.
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Second, during our research we discovered what seemed 
to be the first rule of museum security: you do not talk 
about museum security. Despite some recent moves to 
close the gap, it is perhaps this reticence to involve out-
siders that has left, in many places, a distinct separation 
between security and museum sectors. Drawing learning 
opportunities from other areas would add value to each 
of these sectors. One such example is that of situational 
crime prevention, which ‘is applicable not just to “oppor-
tunistic” street crimes, but potentially to every form of 
crime, however complex, and however determined the 
offenders’ (Clarke 2012: 5), and we therefore see situ-
ational crime prevention as worthy of further exploration 
within the museums context.
Third and finally, we suggest that there is much to be 
gained from developing more tailored programmes for 
staff in museums. A repeated source of dissatisfaction from 
our participants appeared to be the inflexibility of security 
training programmes, which were perceived as being deliv-
ered by individuals and groups that did not understand the 
museum context. Drawing on the best practice and inter-
disciplinary approaches alluded to above, we suggest there 
is a need for the development of completely new training 
programmes, to be delivered in flexibly and contextually 
appropriate packages to suit a range of budgets.
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